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Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the
Post-Communist Era
DR. SAM BLAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-determination is commonly defined as the right allowing a
people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." The general view
during the pest-World War II (WWII) period, and particularly since the
1960s, has been that self-determination has emerged as an operative
legal right in international law2 and has arguably acquired the status
of jus cogens.' The character of self-determination recognized as a le-
gal norm, however, is usually narrowly confined to the cases of people
under colonial rule. Indeed, among international lawyers there is a
controversy as to whether self-determination is a recognized legal
norm outside the colonial context."
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia. This
work is part of a broader research undertaken by the author while working as a
Humboldt Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for International and Public
Comparative Law in Heidelberg, Germany. The author thanks the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation for its kind assistance.
1. This is a standard United Nations (U.N.) definition adopted in most U.N.
literature on the subject. See, e.g., G. Res. 545, U.N. GAOR, 6th Ses., Supp. No.
20, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952); GA Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4884 (1960); GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Seas.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
2. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 120-21 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 597-98 (4th ed. 1990).
3. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 304
(Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun); Hector G. Espiell, Self-Determination
and Jus Cogens, in U.N. LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979); Georg Ress, The Legal Status of Hong Kong
After 1997, 46 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDisCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT [HEIDELBERG JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] [hereinafter ZAORV]
647, 651 (1986).
4. One school argues that as a mechanism for decolonization, self-determination
is applicable only to colonial situations, and that the beneficiaries in respect of
whom self-determination is recognized as a legal right are colonial peoples. See
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOM-
MODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 49 (1990). The proponents of this view argue
further that nationalities, tribes, or minorities that are not recognized as subject to
colonial rule do not have a legitimate claim to self-determination. The logical exten-
sion of this view is that while the territorial entity as a whole may exercise its
right of self-determination to become established as a state, the constituent parts of
the state do not individually possess the right. Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination,
65 AM. J. INTL L 459 (1971).
Another school of thought argues that self-determination is a right for all
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There is substantial literature in international law to support the
thesis that self-determination applies in the post-colonial context."
Nevertheless, the debate on the subject persists. The problems with
post-colonial self-determination are best demonstrated in the case of
Africa. In the colonial period, Africa, which had the largest collection of
colonies, naturally became the center of intense nationalist activity.
For the colonies of Africa, independence came within the framework of
international law under the banner of self-determination. The reality
of the African situation, however, was that almost every colony was in
fact made up of different ethnic groups that had been brought together
by the colonial administrators. The result was that the colonial bound-
aries did not coincide with ethnicity. They certainly provided no evi-
dence of the willingness of the ethnic groups to cohabit under the same
administration.
In the process of decolonization, African nationalists sought, and
were granted, self-determination on the basis of these colonial units. It
is therefore the case that the independent states that emerged after
colonialism in Africa were political entities with boundaries coinciding
with those of the colonies they used to be, with all the arbitrary de-
marcations imposed by colonial rule. The result, as noted by one au-
peoples as such and not restricted to only colonial peoples. Accordingly, it is argued,
the beneficiaries of the right could be any distinct group that can be classified as a
people, irrespective of whether they live under a colonial situation or they are a
part of a sovereign state. This school sees self-determination as an aspect of human
rights and a necessary condition for the proper exercise of democratic rights. See
generally, Robert Rosentock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations, 65 AM. J. INTL. L. 713 (1971); ARISTIDS S.
CALOGEROPOULOs-STRATIs, LE DRorr LES PEUPLES A DISPOSER D'EUX-MEMES 342-48
(1973); UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 199
(1972); MICHAEL B. AXEHuEsT, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53
(4th ed. 1982); Sam K.N. Blay, Self-Determination in Cyprus: The New Dimensions of
an Old Conflict, in 10 AUSTL. Y.B. INTL L. 67 (1983).
5. See generally M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination: The Bangladesh
Experience, 7 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMMES [HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL] 231, 258
(1974); M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self Determination Beyond the Colonial Context:
Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX INTL L.J. 321 (1975); Olga Sukovic, The Principle of
Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 323 (Milan Sahovic ed.,
1972); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: A Tragic Tale of Two
Cities, 66 AM. J. INT'L L 321 (1972); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under Inter-
national Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 257, 275
(1981). Compare Robert A. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry,
in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 307, 313
(Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980); and Eisuke Suzuki, Self-De-
termination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation,
16 VA. J. INTL L. 790 (1976); with Lung Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human
Right, in TOWARDS WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNM 198 (W. Michael Reisman &
Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); and S. Prakash Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12
COLUM. J. TRANSATL. L 260 (1973) (discussing various viewpoints on the applicabili-
ty of self-determination in the post-colonial context).
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thor, is that in the post-1945 era, the Latin American notion of uti
possidetis and the general notion of self-determination were synthe-
sized into the doctrine of decolonization.6
After decolonization, the scene was set in Africa for a second gen-
eration of self-determination demands. After the successful application
of self-determination to decolonize the continent, many of the ethnic
groups within the newly emerged states sought the right to establish
themselves as independent states. Within the post-colonial context in
Africa, the right of self-determination was therefore to become synony-
mous with the right of secession. In spite of persistent demands lead-
ing to endemic wars in several parts of the continent, African states
have generally resisted the application of the right in the post-colonial
context. The basis for their rejection of the right has been principally
political. But on the other hand, they have been helped considerably by
the uncertainty of international law on the subject. If decolonization
demonstrated the success of international law in assisting the peaceful
transition from colonial rule to statehood in places like Africa, then the
law has been a monumental failure with respect to post-colonial self-
determination.
However, just as the international community appears to have
settled with the ambivalence and the failure of the law towards post-
colonial self-determination, political events in Eastern Europe have
brought up the issue of self-determination in a context that, though
not identical to that of post-colonial Africa, is nonetheless very similar
to the African scenario. Since the end of communism in Eastern Eu-
rope, not only has the former East Germany been absorbed into the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), but the world has witnessed the
emergence of several new states that used to be constituent parts of
the Soviet Union (USSR); Czechoslovakia has divided into two states;
and Yugoslavia is still going through the painful traumas of secession-
ist wars that have now turned into wars for territorial acquisition. The
events in Eastern Europe bear some resemblance to post-colonial self-
determination in Africa. In their substance, however, they have suffi-
cient differences to justify including them in a separate category.
These may be categorized as "cases of self-determination in the post-
communist context" rather than the post-colonial context.
A significant feature of the cases of self-determination in the post-
communist context is that they have all attracted responses different
from those in the post-colonial context. All the cases, including Yugo-
slavia, have attracted favorable responses leading to the recognition of
the new states and their subsequent membership in the U.N. The
question of the validity or applicability of self-determination to these
6. Thomas M. Franck, Post Modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in
PEOPLES AND MINORmEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3, 5 (Catherine Brblmann et al.
eds., 1993)
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cases has never been at issue, let alone been disputed.
In this article, the principal objective is to examine the differences
between the post-colonial cases and the post-communist cases of self-
determination and the responses they have tended to attract. The focus
of the article will be on post-communist self-determination and the
interplay between international law and politics in determining the
acceptance or rejection of the right in either case.
II. THE POSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON POST-COLONIAL SELF-
DETERMINATION
The phrase "post-colonial self-determination" can be used in one of
two senses. In a broad sense, it describes the application of, or demand
for, self-determination in any context that is not colonial. In this re-
gard, it specifically relates to the operation of the right after the wave
of decolonization in the post-1945 period. The phrase can also be used
in a narrower sense. In this second sense, it means demands for, and
application of, self-determination in the states that were colonies in
the post WWII period. In this sense, the operation of self-determina-
tion is a genuine "second generation" phenomenon. For the purposes of
this paper the second and narrower meaning of post-colonial self-deter-
mination is preferred because it reflects more accurately the phenome-
non of the self-determination operation under consideration here.
The term "post-colonial" in its broader sense can be misleading.
The range of beneficiaries for self-determination is very wide. For
instance, sovereign states are unquestionably subjects of self-determi-
nation, but the operation of the right in respect of such beneficiaries is
anything but post-colonial. One cannot, therefore, safely use the term
"post-colonial" to refer to all cases of self-determination occurring after
the wave of decolonization. The use of the term in a broader sense also
implies a temporal element. "Post-colonial" interpreted to mean the
period after decolonization, generally without reference to a specific
place and context, presupposes a definite cut-off date for decoloniza-
tion. But decolonization occurred at different places at different times.
It is also debatable whether decolonization has in fact ended, given
cases such as New Caledonia and the other French colonies. On the
other hand, "post-colonial" used in the narrower sense refers to the
specific context involving a claim against a state in the period after the
state itself has exercised self-determination and emerged from colonial
rule.
A. The Normativity of International Law and the Issue of Post-
Colonial Self-Determination.
In their assessment of the law's position on specific issues, inter-
national lawyers state the law as lex lata. In so doing, the usual prac-
tice is for the lawyers to assess specific factual and related issues
278 VOL. 22:2,3
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against a background of the accepted sources and evidence of interna-
tional law and draw appropriate conclusions. Thus, in the specific case
of post-colonial self-determination, the validity of the right is tested
against the sources of law: general or particular conventions, inter-
national custom as evidence of state practice, general principles of law
accepted by civilized nations, decisions of tribunals and the writings of
publicists. These sources do not generally support the existence of the
right. International lawyers using this methodology were therefore
bound to draw negative conclusions after a systematic analysis. The
problem with this methodology is that it seeks to address a normative
issue using non-normative criteria. The point here is that the standard
methodology of testing an issue against a background of the sources of
law to help determine its validity is only useful when we are consider-
ing the issue as lex lata.
In the context of the U.N. Charter and, in particular, regarding
decolonization, the sources clearly establish the legal status of self-
determination as lex lata. However, once the inquiry is expanded to
include post-colonial self-determination as such, within the established
criteria for (colonial) self-determination generally, the result is bound
to be negative because the established criteria make no room for this
variation of self-determination. For instance, a survey of relevant in-
ternational conventions does not indicate any positive recognition for a
right of post-colonial self-determination in international law. In more
specific terms, the U.N. Charter and the Human Rights Covenants
only provide for self-determination in the colonial context. While the
Helsinki Accords (Accords) seem to support post-colonial self-determi-
nation, a careful evaluation of the Accords and the history of their
negotiations reveals at best tepid support for the right.
The formulation of self-determination in the text of the Accords
was the result of intense negotiations between the Western State par-
ticipants and-the Eastern Bloc countries, particularly the former Soviet
Union.' In pursuing the inclusion of self-determination in the Accords,
the Western States were motivated primarily by the desire to restrain
the Soviet Union from any future Czechoslovakia-style invasion under
the Brezhnev Doctrine and to provide a recognized basis for the claims
of self-determination by the Baltic Nations under Soviet rule.' In spe-
cific reference to the Baltic Nations, it was suggested that self-determi-
nation as incorporated in the Accords is a recognition of the "universal
nature of [the principle] for all peoples who have lost their political
independence through force or who have been separated against their
7. Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in HuMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINI ACCORDS 83 (Thomas Buergenthal
ed., 1977).
8. Harold S. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM.
J. INT'L. L 242, 253-56 (1976).
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will.' It is not at all clear that the parties meant to recognize post-
colonial self-determination as such by incorporating the principle in
the Accords. In any case it is instructive to note that before the demise
of the Soviet Union, neither the Baltic States nor post-colonial claim-
ants were able to make any successful claims based on the Accords
because the provisions of the Accords are not legally binding.'" In
pressing for the inclusion of self-determination, the West had therefore
been aware that its practical effects could well be marginal for the
intended beneficiaries.' 1
On the other hand, the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) implicitly rejects post-colonial self-determination through
a commitment to the maintenance of territorial integrity.' The Afri-
can position, as reflected in the OAU Charter, is reinforced by a persis-
tent opposition to separatist claims by African states based on an
agreement by the states to respect their pre-existing colonial bound-
aries and on other political considerations. In the African context,
however, whereas the general opposition to post-colonial claims, on
first impression, gives the appearance of an emerged opinio juris pro-
viding the basis for a regional customary international law rule
against post-colonial claims, a closer examination reveals a different
situation. States that oppose a claim in one instance may quite easily
support a similar post-colonial claim in another instance. Thus, Tanza-
nia recognized Biafra but made no attempt to support the Eritreans.
In the case of the Western Sahara, the OAU members were, and are
still, divided on the admissibility of the claims of the Polisario against
Morocco.' In more recent times, the Banjul Charter has been adopted
incorporating provisions that implicitly support post-colonial self-deter-
mination that undermines the OAU Charter position."' Thus, contrary
to common opinion, one can hardly argue that there exists a regional
rule that precludes post-colonial self-determination in Africa.
General international practice as reflected through the U.N. has
also been far from uniform. The U.N. was silent on the claims of
Biafra, but it tacitly admitted the claims of Bangladesh when the terri-
tory effectively separated itself from the parent state. On the other
hand, the U.N. actively assisted the suppression of the Katanga
claims' and has condemned the purported secession of Cyprus in
9. Boris Meissner, The Right of Self Determination after the Helsinki Accords
for the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INTL L. 375, 378 (1981).
10. See Russell, supra note 8, at 246-49; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence
of Non-Binding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INVL L. 296 (1977).
11. Russell, supra note 8, at 256.
12. ORGAMATiON OF AFRICAN UNITY CHARTER, art. II.
13. See Sam Blay, Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self-Determina-
tion in the Wake of the Bariul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 29 J. AFR. L.
147, 155-56 (1985).
14. Id. at 157-59.
15. S.C. Res. 5002, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1961, at 148,
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recent times.16 Apart from the inconsistent treatment of the cases, the
response of the U.N. in each was not based on any existing interna-
tional law rule against post-colonial self-determination. In all, the
practice of the organization neither supports nor rejects the existence
of the right as a matter of law.
No general principle of law recognized by the legal system of inde-
pendent States permits post-colonial self-determination. On the other
hand, no principle prohibits such claims. Regarding judicial decisions,
the most relevant and direct one is the Aaland Islands Case," which
seemed to support the right but only as a last resort or in very excep-
tional circumstances where a section of a state's population is deprived
of the state's protection. As a rule, however, the decision unequivocally
rejected the existence of the right of self-determination for peoples in a
non-colonial context. 8 With the exception of the African case and the
decision in the Aaland Islands dispute, the various law determining
agencies we have examined do not indicate any recognition or rejection
of a right of post-colonial self-determination in international law. The
African practice only relates to a regional situation and is consequently
restricted. The Aaland Islands decision stands isolated without any
collaboration from international practice, conventions, the general
principles of law or even other judicial decisions. As a result, the cur-
rent international law position on the status of the right of self-deter-
mination in the post-colonial context seems more or less "neutral."
There are no definite international law rules that forbid or permit a
claim to the right. Past cases would suggest that, in general, the law
would accept a claim if it is successful. On the other hand, where
the claim is unsuccessful, the law would recognize the authority of the
parent state as legitimate irrespective of the internal conditions that
may have necessitated the claim in the first place.
In describing international law as neutral, there is the risk of an
implicit suggestion that the law is an abstract machinery that evolves
by itself to assume a positive or negative, or indeed a neutral position
U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961). See also, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1961,
at 132, U.N. Doc. S/4985/Rev.1 (1961) (Draft of resolution submitted by Ceylon, Libe-
ria, and the United Arab Republic); 1961 U.N.Y.B. 57, 65-71, U.N. Sales No. 62.1.1
(discussing the debates).
16. S.C. Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2500th mtg., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1983,
U.N. Doc. S/541 (1983).
17. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920); The Aaland Islands
Question: Report to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of
Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.F. 21/68/106 (1921). See also Charles N.
Gregory, The Neutralization of the Aaland Islands, 17 AM. J. IN7L L. 63 (1923)
(commenting on the decisions on the Aaland Islands question).
18. LKAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., supra note 17; JAMES BARROS, THE AALAND IS-
LANDS QUESTION: ITS SETrLEMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1968) (providing a
detailed documentary account of the dispute).
19. Bangladesh is the best example in this regard.
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on a particular subject matter. International law is not a self-evolving
institution. The development of the law is the product of state activity.
To this extent, the position of the law on a subject matter is in many
respects a reflection of the consensus, or absence thereof, in the com-
munity. This is particularly so in the case of post-colonial self-determi-
nation. A claim of self-determination in the post-colonial context is a
claim on the integrity of the centralized state system. In the countries
where the claims have been made, it is therefore hardly surprising
that the claims have generally met with disapproval. In all the cases,
the rest of the international community has tended to support the
claimants or the parent states depending on political expediency rather
than any set legal standards. The element of political expediency is
perhaps the single most important factor that accounts for the absence
of any coherent rules of international law on post-colonial self-determi-
nation.
In the absence of specific international law rules that deal with
post-colonial self-determination, any inquiry on the subject must neces-
sarily be normative rather than putative. International law is both
normative and dynamic. To this extent, it provides the standard for
measuring state behavior. But in its normativity it can also be molded
to accommodate prescriptions for particular conduct or the develop-
ment of new rules. It is within this context that the issue of post-colo-
nial self-determination needs to be considered.
Before decolonization, self-determination was applied extensively
in Europe. During its evolutionary stages, the beneficiaries of the prin-
ciple had been distinct minorities or peoples who were non-self-govern-
ing or subject to rule by other nationalities. With the emergence of
colonialism and the subsequent need for decolonization, colonial peo-
ples came to be identified as a new category of beneficiaries. As a re-
sult of the focus of self-determination on decolonization since 1945,
international lawyers have tended to dwell on the relevance of the
principle only to colonial peoples. They have thus glossed over the es-
sential similarity between the significance of the principle (as applied
to minorities and nationalities) in the pre-1945 era on the one hand,
and the post-1945 era on the other hand. More importantly, they have
ignored the teleological basis of self-determination over the years as a
right that has applied mutatis mutandis to nationalities, minorities,
occupied territories, and colonial units to remedy situations of subordi-
nation.
The application of self-determination to diverse groups is evidence
of its flexibility. It also lends weight to the view that the right of self-
determination is dynamic and applicable to different beneficiaries in
different circumstances. Just as the right was used to "rectify" cases of
political subordination in previous stages of its evolution and as a
mode of expression of popular will and sentiment for specific forms of
political association, so can it be applied in modern times to similar
282 VOL. 22:2,3
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situations irrespective of whether they are colonial or not.
The case for self-determination, as discussed in this context, re-
lates to the principle as lege ferende rather than as lex lata. Given the
normativity and dynamism of international law, it should be possible
for the law to accommodate this variant of self-determination as it did
with respect to the principle through the period of decolonization. But
to the contrary, not only has the law failed to regulate post-colonial
self-determination, it has tended to be passive when the principle has
been in dispute, even in cases involving major conflicts that threaten
international peace such as the cases in Biafra, Eritrea, and the Su-
dan. Where the law has responded, it has tended to be indeterminate
and inconsistent. In the recent case of self-determination claims in
Europe following the demise of communism, the response of the inter-
national community has been markedly different. The former constitu-
ents republics that chose independence have all been admitted to the
U.N. Even in the case of Yugoslavia, the community has shown a will-
ingness to accept the dismantling of the former Yugoslavian state and
to admit the right of self-determination of Croatia and the other for-
mer regions of Yugoslavia. Does the international community's position
on these post-communist cases indicate a double standard, or is it in
fact an indication of the probable normative development in interna-
tional law of self-determination generally and post-colonial cases for
that matter? Finally, if the responses indicate no double standards, or
if there is not a normative development, then is there a justifiable
basis that adequately explains the difference in attitudes towards
these cases?
III. POST-COMMUNIST SELF-DETERMINATION: THE BACKGROUND
To understand self-determination in the post-communist context,
one must first understand it in the communist context. In WWII, the
Soviet Union was a major power and played a significant role in the
victory of the Allies. During the immediate post-war period, the Soviet
Union emerged as a superpower, consolidated its communist regime,
and established itself as a post-modern empire. In relative terms, the
Soviet empire lasted for only a short period. However, within its brief
fifty year existence, it wielded great influence and power as one of two
international power blocks. Within its sphere of influence were trapped
sovereign states compelled to take up the communist ideology and to
subscribe to the ideals of socialist internationalism. Ethnic, tribal, and
national groups were trapped within the Soviet Union itself and, in
some instances, they were compelled to be part of the union. Even
though the union was made up of independent republics, the constitu-
ent republics were anything but independent entities that could sepa-
rate from the union at will. Communist-style authoritarianism kept
such separatist ambitions under control, usually by the threat of force.
The right of peoples in the Soviet empire to self-determination was no
1994 283
DENY. J. INTL L. & POLYV
more than a Leninist chimera.
A. Self-Determination in the Communist Context
The Russian Empire was primarily a conglomerate of many na-
tionalities ruled over by the Romanovs. What the Bolsheviks inherited
after the 1917 revolution was, therefore, a mosaic of an Empire with
the risk of disintegration into component nationalities. The task for the
Bolsheviks was the reconstitution of what was once the Tsarist domain
and its subsequent harnessing as the basis of the socialist empire that
was to emerge later2
The multinational composition of the Soviet Union was unique
because the territory inherited by the Bolsheviks comprised peoples of
European, Asian, and other racial backgrounds. Uniting the different
nationalities under a post-revolutionary authority was a Herculean
task.2 If the nationalities were to be fused together as a basis for the
grand union of the Soviet State, they needed to be brought together in
the first place. From the beginning, there was evidence of strong resis-
tance from nationalities such as the Ukrainians, the Central Asian
Peoples, and the Transcaucasians, who had been known to demon-
strate strong separatist tendencies. To meet the demands of such
groups, and indeed to appease them, Lenin opted for a strategy of as-
surance that, among other things, nationalities would not be subject to
Russian domination, they would have autonomy, and they would have
the right to secede should they so desire. This provided the motivation
20. After the Civil War and once they were in power, the Bolsheviks made no
secret of their territorial ambitions and their intention to take over the Tsarist
territorium. They perceived themselves as the legitimate heirs of the Tsarist Empire
and looked on themselves as the true successors to the Romanov regime. By the
mid-1920s, Soviet historiography was using this perception as a crucial part of its
claims to rule over the non-Russian population. Quite apart from the justifications
based on Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, early Soviet leaders promoted the idea of replace-
ment as the basis for their right to rule in loco of the Tsarist government because
of the indivisibility of the Tarist Empire. This is a significant point and was later
to be used by Stalin as a justification for the seizure and subsequent annexation (in
his words, the seizure was a reintegration) of eastern Poland, the Baltic countries,
and northern Romania. See Henry R. Huttenbach, Towards a Unitary Soviet State:
Managing a Multinational Society, 1917-1985, in SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES: RUL-
ING ETHNIc GROuPS IN THE USSR 1, 4 (Henry R. Huttenbach ed., 1990) [hereinafter
SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES].
21. As Huttenbach notes,
[t]he re-emergence anywhere after WWI of a viable multinational po-
litical entity of great geographic expanse seemed improbable and, cer-
tainly, unrealistic given the trends embodied in the dramatic contempo-
rary events. The disintegration of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires
and the continued rise of ethnically driven nationalism strongly dictated
against the wisdom of pursuing a more imperial - some would have ar-
gued, indeed Utopian - dream of believing in the possibility of ruling
over diverse and mutually antagonistic peoples within the same borders.
Id. at 1-2.
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for the leadership to make provision for national self-determination22
In the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, assurances
were given to induce the nationalities to join in the grand union of the
Soviet State. The assurances included a range of options that em-
braced self-determination.
As a result, a federal structure of government was established
under which "independent national statehood was granted to some of
the most numerous nationalities. To the smaller ethnic groupings, a
system of national autonomy was granted. The system resulted in the
establishment of 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 auton-
omous oblasts, and 10 national oblasts. Even though the union repub-
lics were assured of the right of secessionist self-determination by the
Soviet Constitution, Lenin made it clear that this did not mean that
the leadership supported secession as such. This is well illustrated by
his often quoted statement that the "right of divorce is not an invita-
tion to all wives to leave their husbands.'
Self-determination in the Soviet Constitution was perceived prin-
cipally as the right to secede. It served the politically important pur-
pose of reassuring nationalities with separatist ambitions. Paradoxical-
ly, it was meant to bring the nationalities into the union and not to
provide the vehicle for secession.' For all practical purposes, the
right of self-determination as such did not exist under the Soviet Con-
22. The nationality question, however, posed a special problem for the Bolshe-
viks. Communist ideology did not allow for different nationalities or for commitments
to ethnicity. Marxist ideology saw nationalism as a bourgeois condition and product
of class society. In the words of Lenin, "workers know no fatherland.* As far as the
architects of the Soviet Union were concerned, nationalism was doomed to oblivion
in the Soviet system once communism was achieved. This objective was to be
achieved by fusing (sliianie) all of the nationalities into the Soviet system. However,
the logic of this strategy was that the stage of separate republics in the union was
to be only a transition towards the eventual sblizhenie or merger of all the groups
into one citizenry. To Lenin, then, self-determination was politically expedient rather
than an inherently functional political theory that had to be put into practice. On
the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power and during the meeting of the second All-
Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the official position
authorized by Lenin was to guarantee autonomy (self-determination) to all the non-
Russian nationalities that found themselves under Soviet rule. Id.
23. The Other Political Issues Raised and Distorted by P. Kievsky, in 23 V.I.
LENIN, SOCHNENIA [LENIN: COLLECE WORKS] 68, 72 (4th ed., Institute of
Markism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU ed., 1960).
24. Lenin and his co-architects believed that while a guarantee of secessionist
self-determination was necessary to encourage the participation of separatist minded
nationalities in the union, with time such nationalities, and in particular the non-
Russian nationalities, would come to realize the benefits of belonging to the union
and would therefore not want to secede. Within Marxist-Leninist ideology, in any
case, nationalist sentiments underlying secessionist demands would wither away with
the development of communism in the Soviet state. To achieve this objective, it was
also part of the strategy to Sovietize the peoples of the various nationalities into a
homogenous group of citizenry with no ethnic oriented allegiances as such.
1994
DENY. J. INTL L. & POLY
stitution or its legal system. Despite the attempts at Sovietization of
the nationalities, parochial nationalist sentiments remained, particu-
larly among the non-Russian nationalities.'
The strict dictatorial system under the Soviet leadership prevent-
ed the non-Russian nationalities from airing their deep resentment
and discontentment. The nationalities were kept in the union through
a system of inducements and whenever necessary by force. Neverthe-
less, they managed to maintain their ethnic identities."
Despite the multi-ethnic character of Soviet society, it was un-
questionably governed from Moscow, which in fact took it for granted
that a diverse population was evolving into a single citizenry under the
great socialist reforms. Indeed, the Bolsheviks and the subsequent
leadership avoided recognition of the highly visible fact of the multina-
tional character of the Soviet Union. In post-revolution propaganda,
emphasis was always placed on the unity of Soviet citizenry rather
than the plurality of the society.
By the 1960s, Soviet leadership was content to suggest that the
nationality issue had been successfully resolved within the socialist
framework, as envisaged in Marxist-Leninist writings. At the 22nd
Party Congress in 1961, for instance, Khrushchev optimistically noted
that "the Party has solved one of the most complex of problems which
has plagued mankind for ages and remains acute in the world of capi-
talism to this day - the problem of relations between nations.' In
25. To bring the nationalities together, the leadership needed an administrative
machinery that could provide the umbrella for an effective integration program. The
Communist Party was to be used as the instrumentality for this purpose. The imme-
diate goal for the party and indeed for the leadership was to neutralize the mutual
antagonisms of the various groups and to bring them together into a common
friendship of nations (druzhba narodov). As a supra-republic institution, the party
was to be ethnically neutral and be managed by cadres drawn from the component
ethnic groups of the union. In many respects, this was in fact the case under a
program called korenizatsiia within the party until the late 1930s when Stalin
changed course and embarked upon a program of Rusification as the basis for dena-
tionalization. The approach of Stalin was different from that advocated by Lenin.
Stalin's Russification strategy undermined the smooth pre-sliianie program of
equal development and comradeship among the nationalities as envisaged by Lenin.
Many of the nationalities suffered glaring disparities. The non-Russian nationalities
were to develop a deep sense of alienation towards Moscow that would last for the
life of the Soviet Empire. The resentment was exacerbated by mass deportations of
some of the nationalities across the Soviet Union in their leadership's effort to cre-
ate that single bend of Soviet citizenry envisaged in Marxist-Leninist ideology.
26. Huttenbach notes that =[n]either carrots nor sticks proffered by tsars or com-
missars, neither generous economic inducements nor violent assaults, ranging from
mass deportation to mass starvation, fundamentally altered the multinational,
multicultural demographic reality of the Soviet Union.* Huttenbach, supra note 20,
at 7.
27. Gregory Gleason, Leninist Nationality Policy: Its Source and Style, in SOVIET
NATIONALITY POLICIES, supra note 20, at 9, 15 (quoting Pravda, October 18, 1961).
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the same vein, the new Party Program adopted by the 22nd Party
Congress went on to suggest that the "borders between the union re-
publics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former signifi-
cance" and that this was the result of the fact that the republics are
"all united into one family by common vital interests and are advanc-
ing together toward a single goal - Communism.' In later years,
Brezhnev put it differently, asserting that a new historical community,
the Soviet people, had emerged.' As recently as 1986, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Party Program adopted a resolution
stating that "the nationality question, as it has been inherited from
the past, has been successfully solved.' ° However, Gorbachev ex-
pressed it in more realistic terms at the 27th CPSU Congress, observ-
ing that [olur achievements should not create the impression that
there are no complications in nationality processes. The contradictions
characteristic of all development are unavoidable in this sphere as
well."31
B. Self-Determination and the Disintegration of the USSR.
The candid admission by Gorbachev that nationality problems still
existed in the Soviet Union must be understood against a background
of his political reforms introduced through glasnost and perestroika.
Not only did glasnost allow a great measure of freedom of speech, it
also provided the nationalities with the avenue to express their resent-
ment and the associated desire to separate from the union. Dozens of
nationalities began to openly voice demands for self-determination,
sometimes interpreted principally in terms of secession. Pent-up na-
tionalist sentiments, most predating the Bolshevik revolution, surfaced
and forced the Soviet leadership to reassess the national question.
The first nationalist challenge to Gorbachev came with the
Kazakh riots of mid-December 1986 in Alma Ata.' From the Kazakh
riots onwards, it appeared the lid had been taken off the Soviet nation-
ality problems. In what appeared to be a chain reaction, the hitherto
ethnically harmonious Soviet Empire seemed to explode into ethnic
unrest. Throughout 1987, there were demonstrations by the Crimean
28. Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovet8kogo Soiuza [Program of the
Soviet Communist Party], KOMMUNIST, No. 16, 1961, at 84.
29. Gleason, supra note 27, at 16.
30. Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza [Program of the
Soviet Communist Party], KOMMUNIST, No. 4, 1986, at 127.
31. Gleason, supra note 27, at 10
32. The riots had erupted after the Kazakh First Party Secretary had been re-
placed with a Russian. This was a break with tradition; in the past, the practice
had been to replace party officials in the periphery with natives from the nationality
in question. To the Kazakhs, the replacement of a local with a Russian amounted to
a blatant act of Russification and an obvious indication of Moscow's insensitivity to
the ethnic realities of the region.
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Tatars, the Baltic peoples, and the Ukrainians. In 1988, the problems
moved to the Transcaucasians. Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian en-
clave administered as part of Azerbaijan, adopted a resolution asking
for the transfer of the territory to Armenia. The resulting demonstra-
tions and riots led to bloodshed, prompting Gorbachev to admit that
the nationality question was far from resolved in the Soviet Union. In
1989, there were further problems in Georgia between Georgians and
Abkhazians that resulted in the use of force by the central government
to bring the situation under control.
The atmosphere of freedom ushered in by glasnost and the gener-
al situation of ethnic unrest provided an excellent basis for increased
nationalist demands. In December 1989, the Lithuanian Communist
Party unilaterally declared its decision to separate from the CPSU. On
March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Parliament, in an action that seemed
rather courageous at the time, declared independence from the Soviet
Union. In an effort to bring the situation under control, the central
government took a series of actions aimed at compelling Lithuania to
rescind its unilateral declaration of independence. But the central
government took further steps to deal with the increasingly nationalist
demands in the other republics, such as Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan. In April 1990, the Supreme Soviet passed a law providing
for a waiting period of five years to secede from the Federation. From
this point onwards, the dismantling of the Soviet Union became only a
question of time.
The general situation of ethnic unrest was exacerbated by econom-
ic decline. These factors, coupled with Gorbachev's rapprochement with
the West and his willingness to negotiate to scale down the military
arsenal of the Soviet Union, were considered by the conservatives as
contributing to the decline of the Kremlin's political control, as well as
the power and influence of the USSR internationally. Disenchanted
members of the Politburo and the military conspired to stage a coup in
August 1991 while Gorbachev was away on holiday. The coup collapsed
within a few days. The conservative forces engineered the coup to stop
the ethnic unrest and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but their
failure further weakened the power of Gorbachev, who had courted
their support, and provided a catalyst for the dismemberment of the
union.
After the collapse of the August coup, it seemed that Moscow
lacked the political clout, or the appropriate justification, to stop the
secession of the three Baltic states - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
On September 17, 1991, the three states were admitted as members of
the United Nations.' Their right to self-determination and the issue
33. See G.A. Res. 46/4, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/4
(1991) (admitting Estonia); G-A. Res. 46/5, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/46/5 (1991) (admitting Latvia); G.A. Res. 46/6, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
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of their admissibility was never disputed. For all practical purposes,
the three republics ceased to be part of the Soviet Union. Their effec-
tive secession left the union with only twelve republics: the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Georgia.
In an effort to forestall any possible domino effect flowing from
the secession of the three republics, Gorbachev negotiated a new all-
union treaty for what was left of the USSR. The treaty aimed at grant-
ing more autonomy to the republics to meet their separatist demands.
But the treaty soon fell into disrepute when, on December 1, 1991,
Ukrainians voted in a referendum for independence by a massive ma-
jority." A week later, the leaders of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus
met in Minsk (Belarus) and proclaimed the establishment of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS).' The CIS at this stage com-
prised only the three "independent" states. The Soviet Union still ap-
peared intact with Gorbachev describing the Minsk Declaration as an
"illegal and dangerous" constitutional coup.' This did not deter the
remaining republics from leaving the union. On December 21, 1991,
the remaining republics, except Georgia, joined the CIS through a
Protocol to the Minsk Agreement, concluded in Alma Ata.87 At this
point in time, the dismemberment of the USSR was complete;' the
union existed in name only. It had no members, and President
Gorbachev became the leader of a union devoid of membership. On
December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned after the Soviet Parliament
voted to dissolve itself. The Soviet Union legally ceased to exist.
Since the break up of the USSR, all the former republics have
become full-fledged independent states and have been subsequently
admitted into the U.N. The validity of their right to self-determination
and their admissibility to the U.N. has never been disputed.
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/6 (1991) (admitting Lithuania).
34. End of Soviet Union - Formation of CIS - Resignation of Gorbachev, 37
KERSING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 38,654 (1991).
35. Minsk Declaration and Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, Dec. 8, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 138, 142 (1992).
36. KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS, supra note 34.
37. It is thus worth noting that the CIS comprises the whole territory of the
former USSR, with the exception of the three Baltic Republics and Georgia. See
generally Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The CIS: Acronym as Anachronism, 29 COEXIS-
TENCE 377 (1992) (discussing the complex international legal status of the CIS and
the relationship between the CIS and the former USSR).
38. It is of interest to note that as far as the members of the CIS are concerned
the demise of the USSR occurred before this period. The Minsk Agreement expressly
mentioned the former Soviet Union.
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C. Self-determination and Disintegration in Other States in the
Eastern Block
Of the Soviet satellite states, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were
two of the most ethnically conscious states, being composed of older
nationalities with separatist ambitions that predate World War I
(WWI). These two states also had the most potential for ethnic strife,
given the history of the sometimes antagonistic relations between their
component groups. The former East Germany, on the other hand, was
the most homogeneous, being composed primarily of people who were
ethnically Germans. When these states were incorporated into the
Soviet Block, they became subject to Marxist-Leninist tenets that regu-
lated their nationality questions and, indeed, their political restructur-
ing.
The Soviet theory of international relations divided the world into
three categories of states: capitalist, socialist, and developing states.
The relationship with the capitalist states was based on peaceful coex-
istence. Peaceful coexistence postulated that there was an antagonistic
class struggle between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.
gowever, this struggle was to be characterized, and for that matter
mitigated, by two critical factors: the absence of the use of force on the
one hand, and cooperation where appropriate on the other. The class
struggle was thus described as peaceful. Since peaceful coexistence
presupposed the existence of a class struggle, it did not apply to the
relationship between the USSR and the other socialist states because
there was not supposed to be a class struggle between such states. The
relationship between Moscow and the socialist states was based on "so-
cialist internationalism." Under the doctrine of socialist international-
ism, the states in the socialist camp were subject to a number of du-
ties. In their domestic sphere, they were obliged to build up socialism
on the Soviet model. In the international sphere, they had the duty to
subordinate their specific national interests to the interest of the
group, the socialist camp. They were also not to terminate their mem-
bership in the Warsaw Pact Organization or the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance.' Within the communist context then, any act of
secessionist self-determination in any of the multinational states was
simply not permissible. In the case of East Germany, any attempt at
political restructuring or act of self-determination purporting to inte-
grate the state with West Germany would have been equally imper-
missible, even if the communist leadership had contemplated such an
act before 1989. Socialist international lawyers tended to describe the
authoritarian relationship between Moscow and the satellite states in
terms of "socialist international law."'
39. Theodor Schweisfurth, The New Approach to the Law of Peaceful Coexistence,
in THE CHANGING POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPE: ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 29, 30 (Rene Lefeber et al. eds., 1991).
40. In the view of socialist international lawyers, this law was supposed to be
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After the rise to power of Gorbachev and the subsequent introduc-
tion of perestroika, the changes in Soviet domestic policies were also
reflected in its policy on international relations and in particular, its
relationship with the other states in the Eastern Block. In 1986, the
Party Program of the CPSU revised and redefined peaceful coexistence
in light of the new thinking that increasingly characterized Soviet
international relations. Under the revised program, coexistence includ-
ed principles very similar to those contained in the U.N. Declaration of
Friendly Relations of 1970. They included the rejection of war and the
use of force, or threat thereof, in international relations, non-interven-
tion in the internal affairs of states, the right of peoples to determine
their own political destiny independently (the right of self-determina-
tion), strict respect for the principle of sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity, and international cooperation on the basis of equality and
mutual advantage.
The revision and redefinition of the concept of peaceful coexistence
was significant because the new principles were of general application
and not just restricted to classical conceptions of class struggle be-
tween capitalist and socialist states. More significantly, it meant that
peaceful coexistence, with its attendant principles of non-intervention
and equality of states, respect for sovereignty, and for self-determina-
tion of peoples, was applicable to the relations between Moscow and
the other states in the socialist camp. The full implication of these
changes were emphasized by Gorbachev in his address during the 70th
anniversary of the October Revolution. He noted that relations with
the socialist states should be based on the "strict observance of the
principles of peaceful coexistence by all, [and] on that rests the prac-
tice of socialist internationalism." More importantly, he noted that "we
have convinced ourselves that socialism has not and cannot have a
'model' which all have to follow." He completed this point with the
observation that all communist parties in the socialist camp are "com-
pletely and irrecoverably independent."1
These pronouncements meant a shift from the Brezhnev Doctrine,
which had hitherto characterized the relationship of the Soviets to
their satellite states, and opened the way for the free development of
policies in these states without Soviet intervention. The exercise of
self-determination was first to lead to the disintegration of East Ger-
many, which voted to be absorbed into West Germany. The disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia followed with the declaration of independence by
Croatia, Slovenia, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ethnic tensions
that developed engulfed the state in a war that continues today. In
the international law of the future once the majority of states became socialist. See
generally THEODOR SCHWEISFURTH, SOzALISriHES VOLKERRECHT? (1979).
41. Id. at 36-37.
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Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and the Slovaks amicably agreed to break
up their federation and to form separate independent states.
IV. THE RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE POST-COMMUNIST
CHANGES
From a political stand point, the failure of communism appeared
to be a vindication of the policies of western capitalist democracy. The
changes, which were accompanied by popular and democratic elections
in all cases, were therefore welcome. In all cases, the U.N., and the
entire international community for that matter, accepted the creation
of the new states without question. At the U.N., the admission of the
new states was undertaken without debate or dissenting votes. The
admission of each new state constituted the legal recognition of that
entity as a state and its concomitant right to self-determination. Even
the African and Asian States that have generally opposed demands for
self-determination in instances outside the classical colonial cases
supported the admission of the new states.
So, what is the fundamental difference between these post-com-
munist cases and the post-colonial demands for self-determination that
warrant different treatment? Even though the post-colonial cases fall
within the framework of the same historical events, the dynamics in
each country leading to disintegration varied. In dealing with this
question, therefore, it is best to consider the cases separately.
A. The States of the Former Soviet Union
1. The Baltic States
The Baltic States comprise Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For
the period of their integration into the USSR, their nationalists per-
sistently argued that the incorporation of the states into the Soviet
Union was illegal because it was not based on their free consent.'2
42. During the expansionist rivalry between Russia and Prussia in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, Russia annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.
In WWI, it ceded all four territories to Germany under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.
However, with the Allied victory in 1918, the Treaty was canceled and all four
states emerged as sovereign nations. They remained independent until the outbreak
of WWII. See generally BERNARD NEWMAN, THE BALTIC BACKGROUND 11, 18 (1948).
See also CouNciL OF EUROPE, THE BALTIC STATES AND THE SOvIET UNION (Estonian
Information Center, Problems of the Baltic Series, No. 1, 1962); ALBERT N. TARULiS,
SovIr PoLicY TOwARD THE BALTIC STATES, 1918-1940 33-68 (1959); U.S. CONGRESS,
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST 1216 AGGRESSION, THE BALTIC STATES: A
STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, THEIR SEIZURE AND INCORPO-
RATION INTO THE USSR, (Intl. Military Law and History Reprint Series No. 4, 1972);
Max M. Laserson, The Recognition of Latvia, 37 AM. J. INTL. L. 233 (1943).
On the eve of the War, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Agreement. The secret protocols to the accord divided Central Eastern
Europe into two spheres of influence. The Baltic States came within the Soviet
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During the period of incorporation, the general claim of Baltic nation-
alism was summed up by Boris Meissner: "the incorporation of the
Baltic States into the Soviet political alliance... did not constitute a
voluntary union based on federal principles, but rather a forcible ac-
quisition forbidden in modern international law."' 8 On the basis of
this illegality, the Baltic States demanded the right to self-determina-
tion as expressed through a return to their pre-incorporation status.
Their demands were basically secessionist.
Under international law, there is no doubt that the Baltic States
were not states as such during the period of their incorporation in the
USSR. Despite their persistent demands for self-determination
throughout the period, Soviet military, political, and economic control
ensured that they could hardly be described as rebel republics. Not-
withstanding the totality of their incorporation, Western states gener-
ally supported their right to self-determination" and declined to rec-
sphere. See Meissner, supra note 9, at 379; STEPHEN P. DUNN, CULTURAL PROCESSES
IN THE BALTIC AREA UNDER SOVIET RULE 17 (Univ. of California, Berkeley, Inst. of
Int'l. Studies Research Series No. 11, 1966). In pursuance of the secret agreements,
the Soviets concluded Pacts of Mutual Agreement with the States of Latvia, Estonia,
and Lithuania in early 1940. The new accords gave the Soviet Union substantial
military concessions in each state. In return, the Soviets undertook not to interfere
in the internal affairs of the Baltic States. Soviet Minister Molotov emphasized this:
"The Pacts ... in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the internal
affairs of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ... [the] foolish prattle of Sovietization of
the Baltics is of use merely to our common enemies." NEwMAN, supra at 160-161.
Stalin also promised that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the three
states after the war. In the summer of 1940, with the Germans advancing into
Western Europe the Soviet Union changed its position on the Baltics. In a dispatch
to the three states, it declared that '[i]n view of the anti-Soviet policy of the govern-
ments of the Baltic States, the USSR [is] compelled to demand from all three States
the formation of such governments as would be capable and willing to ensure that
the Pacts of Mutual Assistance would be loyally carried out.* Id. at 162.
In response, all the political parties in the three states were dissolved and
new ones formed under communist control. In Lithuania, the "Labour Alliance" was
formed; Estonia formed the "Alliance of Working Peoples;* and Latvia inaugurated
the 'Labouring People of Latvia." Id. at 162-64. In the general elections that fol-
lowed, the voting was open for all adults, but the voters had no choice of candi-
dates. Thus, in the three states, communist-controlled parties assumed power by
July 1940. In Lithuania, the party was returned by 99.90% 'yes" votes; Estonia
returned the Working Peoples Party by 93% "yes* votes; and Latvia returned its
party by 97% "yes" votes. A week after the elections it was reported that 'the repre-
sentative assemblies elected by universal suffrage, established Soviet governments in
the three Baltic States, met and decided on the entry of these States into the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics." The incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR
was achieved quite easily under a facade of legitimacy.
When Germany overran the Baltics in WWII, Russian forces were pushed out
of the area. Before the German occupation of the region, the Lithuanians proclaimed
a Provisional Government of the Independent Republic of Lithuania. In 1944, howev-
er, Russia halted the German advance and drove them out of the Baltics. The Baltic
States were thus "liberated" and brought back under Soviet control.
43. Meissner, supra note 9, at 381.
44. This was well demonstrated with the inclusion of the right of self-determina-
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ognize the Soviet annexation or occupation of the Baltic States. They
thus rejected the legality of the Soviet occupation. While this was evi-
dently consistent with the Stimson Doctrine of ex injuria non oritur
jus, it is important to note that there were no acts of recognition, de
facto or de jure, of any of the Baltic States.
There is no duty under international law to recognize entities as
states.' Even where an entity meets all the criteria for statehood,
there is no duty on other states to recognize that entity. On the other
hand, there is a duty not to recognize illegal entities. In general, this
duty arises where the entity to be recognized is an illegal creation or
lacks the accepted attributes of statehood. There would also seem to be
a duty of non-recognition in relation to rebel territories in the process
of seceding from their parent states.' In the case of such territories,
recognition is only permissible in law where the parent state has indi-
cated or demonstrated that it is unwilling or incapable of exerting
control over or reclaiming the territory. In the absence of such con-
ditions, the recognition of the rebel territory may not only be prema-
ture but also constitute an intervention in the affairs of the parent
state.
47
In the specific case of the Baltic Republics before 1990, they could
not be, and were not recognized as states, despite the general support
for their right to self-determination. The reason for this was that they
were not states. Even if they had been rebel territories, which they
were not before 1990, recognition for them would still not have been
possible or prudent given the control exercised over them by the USSR
and the potential for what would most certainly have been classified as
intervention in the affairs of the USSR.
Before 1990, the non-recognition of the Baltic Republics placed
many Western nations, and in particular the United States, in an
awkward legal position. The Baltic Republics existed as independent
states before their annexation by the Soviet Union. The raison d'etre
for the refusal to recognize the Soviet annexation was that it was ille-
gal. The non-recognition of the illegal state of affairs would imply that
Western States subscribed to the status quo ante. This would further
imply that they in fact had the legal justification to recognize the re-
publics if they chose to. More significantly, their recognition of the
republics would not necessarily have been an infringement of the duty
not to recognize. Indeed, for the states that recognized the republics
tion in the Helsinki Accords.
45. See TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION (L.C. Green
ed., 2nd ed. 1951); Phillip M. Brown, The Legal Effects of Recognition, 44 AM J.
INT'L L. 617 (1950).
46. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 127-28 (Herach Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955).
47. Id.
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before their illegal annexation, there may well have been no need for a
second statement on recognition. At the most, they may only have had
to reaffirm their recognition. This not withstanding, they declined
recognition of the republics. The situation underscores the fact that
even though recognition has juridical implications, it is essentially
political in character. Whatever the illegal basis of the annexation of
the republics may have been, the political realities before 1990 militat-
ed against their recognition. Under the control of the Soviet Union, the
republics were for all practical purposes part of the Union. They lacked
independence, both economically and politically. In the cold war envi-
ronment, any attempts to recognize the republics may possibly have
produced a backlash to their disadvantage.
If the cold war environment did not encourage the recognition of
the republics, then the emergence of glasnost came to pave the way for
it. In a referendum on February 9, 1991, seventy six percent of Lithua-
nians voted in support of the independence of the republic. Even
though Moscow declared the referendum illegal, Iceland formally rec-
ognized Lithuania's independence a mere three days later. Denmark
followed with its recognition on February 28.
It is arguable that at this stage, the actions of Denmark and Ice-
land were in breach of the duty of non-recognition since the situation
in the Soviet Union, and indeed in Lithuania itself, was far from set-
tled. In any case the Soviet Union, beset by ethnic demands, was tak-
ing steps to resist the unilateral declaration of independence by Lithu-
ania. Nonetheless, the recognition by Iceland. and Denmark was a
significant morale booster. On May 8, 1991, President Bush met with
the leaders of the three Republics in the White House. While this was
not an act of recognition in itself and had little legal significance, it
was indicative of the sympathies held by the U.S. administration, and
it was an important political step. After the failure of the August coup,
more states came to accept the secession of the Baltic states. Norway
and Argentina recognized Lithuania on August 25, and Sweden and
Finland followed the next day. Sweden subsequently opened embassies
in all the three republics on August 29. On August 27, all the 12 Mem-
bers of the European Community (EC), at a special meeting of EC
foreign ministers, formally recognized the three republics and unani-
mously decided to establish diplomatic relations with them. Australia
recognized the republics on the same day. The United States recog-
nized the Baltic States on September 2. The secession of the three
republics became a fait accompli when the State Council of the USSR
(what was left of it) formally recognized the republics. The admission
of the republics to the U.N. followed these acts of recognition.
It is important to note that apart from the isolated cases of Ice-
land and Denmark, all the acts of recognition for the Baltic states
came after the failure of the August coup. Before this period, the Sovi-
et Union was actively engaged in dissuading the republics from seces-
1994 295
DENV. J. INTL L. & PoLyV
sion through constitutional means, negotiations, and the use of eco-
nomic sanctions. There was also the potential to use military force,
given the presence of Soviet troops in the three republics. For states
that admitted the reality of Soviet control over the republic, there
existed a duty of non-recognition pending the resolution of the crisis by
the USSR.
If there came a spate of recognitions after the failure of the coup,
it was because the coup's failure changed the political realities in the
USSR with definite legal implications. For instance, the Lithuanian
Communist Party, which had allegiance to Moscow, was banned and
its property confiscated by the Supreme Council of Lithuania. The new
government assumed more control of the territory and established a
greater degree of independence with the departure of the Soviet Interi-
or Ministry special (OMON) troops and the issuing of visas to foreign
visitors. These factors provided legal conditions that distinguished the
case of the three republics from the post-colonial cases and justified
the international responses to them. In specific terms, the legal con-
ditions may be summarized as follows.
(a) The Incapacity or Unwillingness of the USSR to Exercise
Control Over the Territory
As indicated earlier, there is a duty of non-recognition in relation
to seceding territories in transition where evidence indicates that the
parent state is making efforts to exercise or regain control of the terri-
tory. The converse of this condition is that where there is indication
that the parent state is either unable or unwilling to assume such con-
trol, recognition is permissible. Events in the USSR after the failure of
the August coup indicated ample evidence of the incapacity or unwill-
ingness of the central administration to exert control over the repub-
lics. After the failure of the coup, the hardliners who opposed reforms
in the USSR and the secessionist demands of the republics were either
arrested or neutralized. Within days after the coup's failure, the Rus-
sian Federation, which was still a member of the USSR, formally rec-
ognized Lithuania as an independent state. All these factors, coupled
with the withdrawal of OMON troops from Lithuania, were indications
of the softening of Moscow's stance and, at the very least, evidence of
its unwillingness, if not incapacity, to exert control.
(b) Absence of Contest from the USSR and the Multiplier Effect
of Recognitions
The apparent unwillingness or incapacity to exert control was
reinforced by the absence of protest from the USSR to the initial acts
of recognition by Iceland and Denmark. Since the USSR had initially
declared the Lithuanian independence to be illegal and had followed
with an economic blockade, it would have been logical and appropriate
to indicate unequivocally to the international community that recogni-
VOL. 22:2,3
SELF-DETERMINATION
tions would be considered intervention in the internal affairs of the
USSR. But the central administration failed to offer any meaningful
protest or deterrent to prospective recognitions.
The absence of protest, coupled with the failure of the August
coup encouraged further recognitions, which in turn spurred a multi-
plier effect for future recognitions. In other words, the unchallenged
initial acts of recognition encouraged other recognitions, which were
then used by more states as "justification" for their own recognition of
the Baltic Republics. The recognitions in this context tended to have a
constitutive effect to the extent that they gave the appearance of a fait
accompli to the secessionist efforts of the Republics. Indeed, the recog-
nition of the Republics by the State Council of the USSR, after the
recognition by the members of the EC and the United States, seemed
to indicate the acceptance of this fait accompli.
(c) The Attainment of the Attributes of Statehood
Recognition of an entity is conditional on the entity's possession or
attainment of the attributes of statehood. In the case of the three Bal-
tic Republics, there is of course no doubt that each possessed the basic
attributes of land, population, and government. The capacity of each to
enter into international relations was also not disputed. Their inde-
pendence may have been an issue before the failure of the August
coup, since Moscow controlled their territories militarily, economically,
and to some extent politically. After the failure of the coup, however,
the republics gained greater control over their territories. The estab-
lishment of national guards, the issuing of visas to visitors, the enact-
ments of their parliaments dealing with issues ranging from defense
policy, foreign policy, and property previously controlled by the central
administration, helped to confirm their new independent status.
(d) The Differences Between the Post-Communist Cases of the
Three Baltic Republic and Post-Colonial Cases
The Baltic cases have three fundamental features: The parent
state was either unable or unwilling to exercise or regain control over
the seceding territories, a significant degree of independence and the
attainment of the other attributes of statehood, and the absence of
protest against recognition by states. These three important features
are persistently absent in the post-colonial cases. With the exception of
Bangladesh, there has been no case wh-3re the parent state has demon-
strated an incapacity or unwillingness to exert or regain control over a
part of its territory engaged in secessionist conflict. In the case of Ban-
gladesh, once it became apparent that Pakistan was unable to regain
control, the condition was created for its recognition and subsequent
admission into the U.N. To this extent, the post-colonial case of Ban-
gladesh is no different from the Baltic cases.
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The critical difference between the three post-communist cases
and the post-colonial cases is the absence of control by the parent
state. Once the parent state loses control over the seceding territory,
and if the other indicia of statehood are present, the territory becomes
an independent state in nacsendi. All that is required to complete its
"creation" as a state is its recognition by other states. The Baltic cases
belong in this category. On the other hand, when the parent state
continues its efforts to exert control, the territory remains an integral
part of it. The principles of non-intervention and respect for territorial
integrity impose a duty on states to desist from recognizing the seced-
ing territory in such circumstances. The post-colonial cases belong in
this category.
A logical extension of the critical difference between these two
categories of cases is that the Baltic cases appeal to, and are accommo-
dated within, the existing putative rules of international law on recog-
nition and the creation of states. On the other hand, the post-colonial
cases involve a demand for acceptance or recognition even where the
parent states still exert control, or are making efforts to do so. In this
regard, they appeal to the normativity of international law and not to
its putative rules. This is because current international law does not
allow the recognition of an independent territory that is still effectively
part of another territory. The issue whether the international system
can and should evolve rules to admit cases of secession, even where the
parent state is capable of exerting or is willing to exert control, is the
principal difficulty confronting post-colonial cases. The Baltic Republics
had no such difficulties.
2. The Other Soviet Republics
The emergence of the twelve remaining republics was the result of
the Minsk Agreement and the Alma Ata Protocol.' Central to the
Agreement and the Protocol was the mutual agreement of the constitu-
ent republics to dismantle the union. The republics did not secede as
such from the union, they dissolved it. It is arguable, however, that
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus concluded the Minsk Agreement to form
the CIS without the remaining nine republics of the union. Thus, in
spite of references in the Alma Ata Agreement to the "former Soviet
Union," the USSR in fact existed after the Minsk Agreement, consist-
ing of the nine remaining Republics. To this extent, the conclusion of
the Minsk Agreement amounted to a secession from the union. If this
is indeed the case, the secession itself is of relative significance in
assessing the legal aspects of the international responses to the CIS.
This is because international recognition for the CIS members and
their subsequent admission into the U.N. came after the constitutional
dissolution of the USSR and the resignation of Gorbachev. Following
48. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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the dissolution of the USSR, the constituent republics emerged as
independent entities, and each possessed the basic attributes of state-
hood. International recognition completed the process of their estab-
lishment as independent states.
(a) The Differences Between the CIS States and Post-Colonial
Cases
There are several differences between the cases of the former
Soviet Republics and the post-colonial cases. The emergence of the
states was the result of a mutually agreed dissolution of their parent
state. No rule of international law prohibits the mutual dissolution of a
state by its component units and the subsequent creation of states out
of those units. The dissolution of a state leaves the component units
free to exercise their self-determination through complete indepen-
dence, association with an existing state, or integration into another
state. The dissolution by itself also means there is no parent state to
resist the break away or to attempt to exert control over the new enti-
ties, thereby undermining the legality of any act of recognition. Such
cases differ significantly from the post-colonial cases where the seced-
ing territories continue to be part of an existing parent state and thus
subject to conditions that bar their recognition.
B. The Unification of Germany
Before 1989, the general view was that the division of Germany
was permanent 9 and that, in any case, the "German question" will
remain unresolved so long as the Brandenburg gate remained
closed.' On November 10, 1989, however, the Berlin Wall opened.
Less than a year later, the two "Germanies" united. The unification of
Germany is without a doubt one of the most significant events in the
modem history of Europe. Coming in the wake of glasnost and
perestroika in the Soviet Union and the general situation of liberaliza-
tion in Eastern Europe, the unification was the culmination of a cata-
logue of political events in Europe. In many respects, the word "unifi-
cation" used to describe the event is a misnomer. This is because the
"unification" occurred after the disintegration of the former East Ger-
many, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was not, therefore,
the coming together of two states as such. For the purposes of our
present discussion, the label that may be appropriately used to de-
scribe the event is immaterial. What is material is that the two related
49. Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The Status of Germany in International Law:
Deutschland aber Deutschland?, 38 INTL & CoMip. L. Q. 609, 634 (1989).
50. See, e.g., President von Weizsdcker, Address Before the 21st Convention of
the Evangelical Church, (June 8, 1985), in U.S. DEPr OF STATE, THE AXIS IN DE-
CLINE: DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1985, at 1415 (1985) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE].
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phenomena of the disintegration of the GDR and the subsequent unifi-
cation were made possible by the breakdown of communism and were
pursued within the context of self-determination. They therefore con-
stitute a legitimate subject for discussion under post-communist self-
determination.51
1. Background to the Disintegration and Unification
The unification of Germany has its roots in the division of the
country after WWII and the subsequent disintegration of the GDR.
Following the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany in
WWII, the country was divided into different zones of occupation,1
2
but this was only for the purposes of the occupation by the Allied Pow-
ers. The division of the country into separate political units as such
was not made part of the agenda of the Allied Powers.' However,
51. In an address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Ger-
many, Chancellor Kohl declared that "[amny one who today, in an attitude of resigna-
tion and fatalism, draws a final line under the German question is rejecting the
right of self-determination and the realization of human rights .... " Chancellor
Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany,
(Feb. 27, 1985), in U.S. DFP'T oF STATE, supra note 50, at 1387, 1396. Chancellor
Kohl concluded his address by quoting a declaration by the Bundestag adopted a
year earlier:
Our country is divided, but the German nation lives on .... It re-
mains our task to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the
German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination. The
German Bundestag reaffirms the right of the German people to exercise
peacefully its right of self-determination.
Id.
52. At the end of the War, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
USSR concluded agreements providing for the division of Germany and Berlin into
separate zones of occupation. Each of these States was to occupy about one third of
Germany. Berlin, although situated in the Soviet zone, was to be administered sep-
arately by the three Powers, each having its own sector in the city. While each of
these States had full authority to run its own zone and sector, decisions with regard
to Berlin and Germany as a whole were to be taken jointly. At a later stage, France
was invited, and it agreed, to participate in the administration of Germany and
Berlin. It took over responsibility for its own occupation zone in Germany, taken
from the American and British zones, and its own sector in Berlin, also from the
sectors controlled by these States. See generally Protocol on Zones of Occupation and
Administration of the 'Greater Berlin Area," Sept. 12, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2078, 227
U.N.T.S. 279.
53. From the outset there was no apparent intention that Germany should be
divided. Indeed, it was clear that, while suggestions had been made that the country
be split up (the Morgenthau Plan, for instance), the Four Powers actually intended
to treat Germany as one country. Following the unconditional surrender of Germany,
they issued a declaration that was of crucial significance for Germany in two ways.
First, the declaration provided that the Four Powers would 'assume supreme author-
ity with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German
Government, the High Command and any state, municipal or local government au-
thority. The assumption ... of the said authority and powers does not effect the
annexation of Germany." Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the
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disagreements between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Un-
ion made the joint administration of the defeated state as a single unit
impossible. The economic and political division between the zones ad-
ministered by the Western Powers and that of the Soviet Union, exac-
erbated by the Berlin blockade, led to the establishment of West Ger-
many, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in September 1949.'
In October 1949, the Soviet Union responded to these developments
with the establishment of the GDR.' Even though both states pos-
Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Allied Powers,
June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, 1650, 68 U.N.T.S. 189, 190. This meant that the Four
Powers were assuming total authority, almost akin to sovereignty, over Germany,
but they nevertheless explicitly refused to annex it. This statement manifested a
clear intention to maintain the existence of Germany as one State; it was not to be
divided. The second major provision in the declaration was the express assumption
by the Four Powers of the right and obligation to 'hereafter determine the bound-
aries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at
present being part of German territory." Id. 60 Stat. at 1650-51, 68 U.N.T.S. at 190-
92. That. Germany was to be maintained as a single unit is evident also from the
Potsdam Agreement, which provided that a Council of Foreign Ministers was to be
set up, inter alia, to prepare "a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the
Government of Germany when a Government adequate for the purpose is estab-
lished." Protocol of Proceedings Approved at Berlin (Potsdam), Aug. 2, 1945, 3
Bevans 1207, 1208. However, in that same agreement it was clear that, while Ger-
many would continue to exist, there would be limits to its freedom of action. Thus it
was agreed in principle that the northern part of East Prussia, including
Kbnigsberg, should become part of the Soviet Union subject only to final determi-
nation at the peace settlement. Similarly, large areas of "former German territory"
(including southern East Prussia, Pomerania, parts of Mazuria and Lower Silesia)
were placed under Polish administration subject to final delimitation at a peace
settlement. Id. at 1218.
54. At this stage, the FRG was not a fully independent State. The process of
moving towards independence lasted for six years, and the western powers clearly
retained a substantial amount of control. The country remained under occupation
until 1955, when the Paris Protocol came into effect. See Convention on Relations
Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, 6
U.S.T. 4251, 331 U.N.T.S. 327; Paris Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation
Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany [hereinafter Paris Protocol], Oct. 23,
1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 253. Moreover, the FRG constitution, the
Grundgesetz, was subject to the veto of the three western Powers, a veto which was
employed significantly when they refused to allow Berlin to be treated as part of the
Federal Republic - a measure that had been proposed by the framers of the
Grundgesetz. By exercising authority with regard to Berlin, the western Powers as-
serted rights over Germany as a whole, the same rights that may impede the
Germans' right to self-determination.
Following the establishment of the FRG, the Soviet Union, on October 1, 1949
sent a note to the United Kingdom, the United States, and France protesting this
development as a "completion of the policy of splitting Germany . . . in violation of
the Potsdam Agreement under which these States, jointly with the Soviet Union
assumed the obligation of treating Germany as one single whole .... " Note from
the Soviet Union to the United States Protesting the Formation of a Separate Gov-
ernment for the Western Zones of Germany (Oct. 1, 1949), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
supra, note 50, at 274.
55. In a statement regarding the establishment of a provisional Government for
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sessed most of the attributes of statehood, they were subject to many
restrictions, including the issue of unification.'
the .GDR, the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany made it clear
that, like the FRG, the independence of the new State would be limited by the
existence of certain rights and obligations of the Four Powers with regard to Germa-
ny as a whole. "In the place of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, a
Soviet Control Commission will be established charged with exercising control over
the fulfillment of the Potsdam and other joint decisions of the Four Powers in re-
spect of Germany.- Statement by the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in
Germany on the Establishment of a Provisional Government of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, (Oct. 10, 1949), in U.S. DEFPT OF STATE, supra note 50, at 306-08.
The reference to fulfilling the Potadam and other decisions acknowledged the re-
quirement that Germany would remain under the control of the Four Powers until it
had been prepared for a peace settlement, at which time final decisions were to be
made regarding its status and boundaries. This acknowledgment showed that the
USSR continued to recognize that the Four Powers jointly rights and responsibilities
that it could not unilaterally abrogate.
56. In terminating the occupation regime in the western zones, the United King-
dom, the United States, and France made it clear, and West Germany accepted, that
their rights with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole subsisted.
[I]n view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the
reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the
Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exer-
cised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole,
including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement [emphasis
added].
Paris Protocol, supra note 54, 6 U.S.T. at 4121-22, 331 U.N.T.S. at 260 (Schedule I
Amendments to the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the
Federal Republic of Germany, signed as part of the Paris Protocol).
In other words, the FRG expressly accepted that the reunification of Germany
lies in the competence not of itself but of third States. Moreover, it is clear from the
text of the treaty that these rights do not derive from the agreement itself but rath-
er possess an independent foundation, viz, the assumption of supreme authority with
regard to Germany by the Allies in 1945. Thus, mere denunciation of the treaty by
the FRG would not remove the retained competence of the western Powers. It
seems, therefore, that even after the termination of the occupation regime, the Fed-
eral Republic, though it may have become an independent State, was nevertheless
subject to major restrictions to its freedom of action as far as the German question
was concerned.
A similar position was adopted by the USSR vis-a-vis the GDR. In a state-
ment issued on March 25, 1954 attributing full sovereignty to the GDR, the USSR
asserted that the GDR "shall be free to decide internal and external affairs, includ-
ing the question of relations with Western Germany, at its discretion.' Statement by
the Soviet Union Attributing Full Sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic,
(Mar. 25, 1954), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 50, at 418. On its face, this
stance seems to be contrary to that of the Western Powers. However, in that same
statement, the USSR "retain[s] in the German Democratic Republic the functions
connected with guaranteeing security, and resulting from the obligations incumbent
on the USSR as a result of the [Potsdam] Agreement.* Id. A similar approach was
adopted the following year in the Treaty on Relations between the USSR and GDR.
While article 1, paragraph 2 refers to the GDR as being "free to take decisions on
all questions pertaining to its domestic and foreign policy, including its relations
with the Federal Republic of Germany," this has to be read in light of the statement
in the Preamble that refers to the obligations of the USSR and the GDR "under
existing international agreements relating to Germany as a whole." Treaty Concern-
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Because of the limitations imposed upon the FRG and the GDR
when they were founded, they had no prima facie right to reunify,
except with the consent of the Four Powers. In 1945, the Allies as-
sumed supreme authority over Germany, including the right to decide
upon its status and frontiers. When Germany was divided and the two
new States set up, these rights were maintained. Indeed, the treaty
giving the FRG full independence expressly retained for the Powers
the right to decide upon the unification of Germany.57 Thus, in the
early 1970s, when the FRG concluded its Ostpolitik treaties, which
served to establish that State's relations with certain socialist States
on a more normal footing, it was always emphasized that the rights
and duties of the Four Powers subsisted." When East and West Ger-
many applied for admission to the U.N., similar declarations were
forthcoming.
The developments regarding Germany since 1945 made clear that
the country lost control of its destiny to the Four Powers. While this
was intended to be a temporary state of affairs, political developments
made the achievement of a peace settlement impossible. The extent of
the collapse in relations between the USSR and the Western Powers
was such that each side preferred to establish its own German client
State rather than allow Germany to remain united under the influence
of the other. To safeguard their own influence over Germany, they
concluded treaties in which the new states accepted the subsistence of
the rights, established in 1945, to decide Germany's status and fron-
tiers. Any serious move towards reunification was dependent upon the
political will of the Four Powers to reach agreement, rather than ini-
tiatives by the German States."
ing Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, Sept. 20, 1955, U.S.S.R.-G.D.R., 226 U.N.T.S. 201. Thus the GDR,
like the FRG, was given full freedom to conduct its own affairs, including its inter-
national relations, subject to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers con-
cerning Germany as a whole. The GDR, again like the FRG, was bound by the four
Power agreements on Germany, even if it had elected to denounce the treaty with
the USSR.
57. Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, supra note 54.
58. Note from the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany Confirming,
with Respect to a West German-Poland Treaty, the View of the Federal Republic on
Quadripartite Rights (Nov. 19, 1970), in U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 50, at
1113.
59. Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The Arithmetic of German Unification: Three into One
Does Go, 40 INTL & COMP. L Q. 635, 641 (1991). The question remains whether the
unification process could have gone through without the consent of the Four Powers.
See Jochen A. Frowein, Die Verfassungslage Deutschlands im Rahmen des
V6lkerrechts, in DEuTScHLANDS AKTUELLE VERFASSUNGLAGE 7, 12-14 (1990).
1994 303
DENV. J. INYL L. & POL'Y
2. The Unification of Germany
Unification was central to German politics. From the outset, the
FRG always regarded the division as a temporary state of affairs. The
authorities avoided the writing of a constitution, which they believed
would seal the division forever. When a constitution was finally adopt-
ed, it was condemned "as a bastard Constitution produced in nine
months through pressure by the military occupation.' ° To emphasize
its temporary nature, it was called the Basic Law rather than the Con-
stitution." It was only passed by Parliament and not by popular ref-
erendum. Many aspects of the Basic Law reflected very clearly the
temporary nature of the division." The Basic Law at any rate under-
scored the temporary state of affairs with the provision in Article 116
that German citizenship extended to the people of East Germany."
Despite the resolve of the FRG statesmen to ensure that the divi-
sion did not become permanent, it was also generally accepted that
unification could not occur without the cooperation, and indeed con-
sent, of the Four Powers. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Four Pow-
ers met occasionally to discuss issues relating to Germany, including
the question of unification. There was a general agreement that uni-
fication should be the result of free election. However, the Soviet Union
added the significant condition that unification could only be achieved
through an agreement between the two Germanies. This condition
tended to place the Western allies in an impossible position. While
they favored unification, they did not recognize the GDR and were
consequently unwilling to accept its consent and role in the unification
arrangements. There was also the obvious possibility that a GDR
blessed with the implied recognition from the West might in any case
refuse to accept unification.
In spite of the failure to agree on a modus operandi for unification
of the two Germanies, considerable advances were made towards
greater cooperation in the 1970s through Willy Brandt's policy of
Ospolitik.' In 1972, the two Germanies concluded a treaty of coopera-
60. DAvID P. CONRADT, THE GERMAN POLITY 17-18 (3rd ed. 1986).
61. In this regard, it is interesting to notice the wording of Article 46, which
states that the Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day that a constitution
adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force. Id. at 17.
62. Judgement of Aug. 17, 1956, BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 5
Entscheidungen des Bundesverewaltungsgericht [BVerfGE] 85, at 127 (F.R.G) (show-
ing the response of the German courts to the temporary state of affairs as far as
the division was concerned).
63. Gregory S. McCurdy, German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of
Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 253, 258-61
(1990).
64. Willy Brandt stated that his policy was, first, to renew negotiations without
discrimination for the purpose of achieving a treaty of cooperation, and, second, to
relax relations between the two Germanies and to achieve togetherness after a peri-
VOL. 22:2,3
SELF-DERMINATiON
tion." While the treaty constituted the first formal act of recognition
of the GDR, it also, ironically, paved the way for increased cooperation
and eased the way to eventual unification. As a result, several commis-
sions were established during the 1970s that enhanced intra-German
relations. The close relations developed further in the 1980s with a
series of meetings between political leaders from both sides and the
conclusion of a range of cultural agreements in 1986. In 1987, Eric
Hoenecker visited the FRG, becoming the first leader of the GDR to do
so since 1949. The close relationship that had grown, beginning in the
1970s, resembled a cordial relationship between two independent
states. Whatever the wishes of the FRG politicians may have been,
unification as such was not considered part of the immediate agenda.
It took the political changes in the Soviet Union to make unification
possible on October 3, 1990.
3. The Differences Between the German Unification and Post-
Colonial Cases
Even though German unification was commonly accepted as an
act of self-determination, there are significant differences between it
and the post-colonial cases. For one thing, the Federal Constitution of
Germany expressly provides for unification in Article 23, which allows
the accession to the German Federation by other parts of Germany.
Indeed, in 1956, the Saarland joined the Federal Republic through the
operation of Article 23." The accession was affected after a decision
favoring unification had been made democratically by the representa-
tive organs of the GDR.
For the purposes of German internal law, the unification was simply
an act of accession consistent with the Constitution. From the perspec-
tive of international law, the accession was also consistent with exist-
ing norms. An existing state such as the FRG may accept the accession
of any territorial entity so long as the accession is not in breach of any
international agreements or the territorial integrity of another state.
Logically, a state also has the right to accept the reintegration by ac-
cession of a part of its own territory that had been separated. Indeed,
od of regulated existence side by side. See F.W. Hess, German Unity: Documentation
and Commentaries on the Basic Treaty, in EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS 23 (1974). See
also LAWRENcE L. WHETTEN, GERMANYS OsTPOLrrlI RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FED-
ERAL REPmusc AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES (1971) (describing the policy of
Ostpolitik generally).
65. The treaty was approved by the Bundestag on May 11, 1973 and subse-
quently by the Bundesrat on May 25, 1973. Despite the formal recognition of the
GDI, the treaty did not extend such recognition to East Berlin. The validity of the
treaty itself was contested before the German constitutional court. See Judgement of
July 31, 1973 (Intra-German Treaty Case), BVerfG, 36 BVerfGE 1, 7-10 (F.R.G).
66. The Saarland is one of the lAnder (states) in the German Federation. See
Fritz Miinch, Zum Saarvertrag vom. 27 Oktober 1956, 18 ZA6RV 1 (1958). See also
Jochen A. Frowein, Germany Reunited, 51 ZA6RV 333, 336 (1991).
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in such cases the principles of territorial integrity and self-determina-
tion warrant the encouragement and the recognition of the reintegra-
tion.
The unification can also be considered in terms of the actions of
two independent states. Despite the anomalies relating to the creation
of the GDR and the unique position of the Allied Powers over the two
parts of Germany, for all practical purposes the two entities were inde-
pendent states. International law permits the unification of any two or
more states so long as the union is based on the free consent of the
states concerned and the union is not in breach of any international
agreements. The unification was partly the result of the Treaty of
Unification concluded between the two German states on August 31,
1990. The Treaty, which regulated the details of the unification, came
into effect on September 23, 1990 after approval by the houses of par-
liament - the Bundestag in the FRG and the Volkskammer in the
GDR. An interesting aspect of the unification of the two states is that
the Unification Treaty provided quite specifically that "with the com-
ing into effect of the accession of the German Democratic Republic to
the Federal Republic of Germany... the ILAnder Bradenburg,
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thiiringen
[all states in the GDR] become LAnder of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many." The GDR ceased to exist after the unification, while the FRG
continued, albeit with an expanded territory. It has been argued,
therefore, that there was no unification between two states as such,
but that there was instead an absorption.' The label one employs to
describe the union between the two states is of no great relevance to
this work. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the unification,
however described, was made possible partly because of the agreement
of the two German states and it was consistent with international law
norms. Another important aspect of the unification was that it was
not the simple result of an agreement between the uniting parts of
Germany but of a complex agreement between the Four Powers and
the two German states. Three of the powers - France, Great Britain,
and the United States - as occupation powers had undertaken treaty
obligations to cooperate to achieve the common aim of unification of
Germany pending a peace settlement.6 The treaty was concluded
with the FRG as the recognized successor of the state of Germany that
had surrendered unconditionally after the war. Even though the treaty
was not concluded with the GDR and the Soviet Union, there was no
doubt about its propriety and the desire of the three Powers to fulfil
their obligations in 1990. As a result, the unification and the recogni-
tion of its validity comprised an important aspect of the final peace
settlement between Germany and the Allied Powers.
67. Piotrowicz, supra note 59, at 635.
68. Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, supra note 54, art. 7, 6 U.S.T. at 4258, 331 U.N.T.S. at 334.
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Like the preceding cases, the unification of Germany and its sub-
sequent acceptance, while presented on the basis of self-determination,
fits into existing international law norms. Unlike the post-colonial
cases, the unification does not require the application of new rules of
self-determination as lege ferenda.
C. The Division of Czechoslovakia
On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic voted to dissolve the Czechoslovakian Federa-
tion as of December 31, 1992. On January 1, 1993, the former Republic
of Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. In its place emerged two new states,
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. On January 19, 1993,
both states were admitted to the U.N. The issue of the disintegration
of the former state of Czechoslovakia and the validity of the creation of
the two new states were never brought into question. The logical pre-
sumption is that the creation of the states was consistent with self-
determination.
1. The Division of Czechoslovakia Distinguished from Post-
Colonial Cases.
International law does not prohibit the voluntary disintegration of
a state. Neither does it prohibit the creation of new states out of the
disintegrating state. Allowing an existing state to determine its politi-
cal destiny through unification or integration with other states is con-
sistent with the principle of self-determination. But it is equally con-
sistent with the principle for a state to choose to dissolve itself and
enable the creation of one or more new states out of its territory. The
voluntary disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the formation of the
two new states are thus consistent with existing norms for the creation
of states and with self-determination. The significant difference be-
tween the Czechoslovakia disintegration and the post-colonial cases
that threaten disintegration is that in the latter cases, the disintegra-
tion is never voluntary. In all the cases, the demands for self-determi-
nation are resisted, and secessionist conflicts arise precisely because of
the prospects of disintegration of the parent state. Where the parent
state itself opts for disintegration, the potential for conflict is obviously
removed subject to the amicable and equitable distribution of the as-
sets of the state. Where the parent state ceases to exist because of a
dissolution, recognition of the newly formed states poses no legal prob-
lems if the new entities fulfill all the remaining conditions for state-
hood. On the other hand, as noted earlier, if the disintegration and the
demand for self-determination are opposed by the central authority or
the parent state, the rules on non-recognition apply to make the new
entities inadmissible. Unlike Czechoslovakia, the post-colonial cases
fall in this latter category.
1994
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
D. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
Of the post-communist cases of self-determination, the disintegra-
tion of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent bloody crisis that has
continued until this day is easily the most tragic. The former republic
of Yugoslavia was a federation comprising Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia. It also included the
two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The dominant na-
tionalities are the Serbs, Slovens, and Croatians. Since the post-WWI
era, separatist agitations have been a significant aspect of Yugoslavian
politics, with Croatians in the forefront of the separatist demands. In
the post-WWI political organization of the State, the Serbs dominated.
This arrangement provided acute ethnic antagonism with the
Croatians demanding autonomy. By 1928, the political system had
degenerated and polarized around two main forces: the Centralists,
comprising the Serbs, and Federalists, headed by the Croatian political
parties. In the series of political disturbances that followed, three sig-
nificant changes occurred: all ethnic based organizations were banned;
all federalists' agitations were outlawed; and the State's name was
changed to Yugoslavia.
These attempts to create a unified state system and forge new
bonds for nationhood met with considerable Croatian opposition mani-
fested in a new wave of autonomist protests. The tensions in the State
continued until 1939. To harmonize divergent interests in order to
ensure a concerted national effort for the impending war, the central
government made considerable concessions for Croatian autonomy
under what came to be called the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement.' En-
couraged by this development, Croatian nationalism took on a new
zeal with the emergence of the radical Ustashi group, which demanded
complete independence.
Croatian separatism was generally opposed by the Serbs, who
considered it anti-Yugoslavian. Thus, in 1941, when the government
was dismissed in a military coup 0 for its pro-Axis policies, the
Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement was annulled. The Croatians subsequent-
ly became allied with Germany, which promised to establish a sover-
eign state of Croatia with the defeat of Yugoslavia. In April 1941, on
the eve of the German invasion, the Croatians proclaimed the indepen-
dent State of Croatia. As part of their war effort, they organized the
quisling forces and fought on the side of the Axis against the partisan
forces of the Serbs and the forces of the Communist Party of Yugosla-
via. This helped to accentuate Croatian-Serb antagonism. With the
defeat of the Axis, the State of Croatia fell, and it was once again in-
69. Jozo TOMASEVICH ET AL., CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA 29-32, 60-61 (Wayne S.
Vucinich ed., 1969).
70. This is usually described as the (military) Putsch of March 1941. Id. at 67.
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corporated into the State of Yugoslavia.
After WWII, President Tito began unifying Yugoslavia. He created
six federated republics along the old historic and basically ethnic lines.
These efforts, and later constitutional reforms, did not resolve the
separatist agitations, but the centralist role of the communist party
helped to keep the nationalist sentiments in check. The end of commu-
nist rule provided the opportunity for the resurgence of the separatist
demands.
The current crisis began with the demands by Croatia and
Slovenia for sovereignty within a loose Yugoslav confederation. When
these demands were rejected, they sought complete independence from
the Yugoslav Republic. Similar demands were later made by Bosnia-
Herzogovina and Macedonia. To date, the crisis has gone through two
significant phases. The first phase comprised the initial Croatian and
Slovenian demands for independence and the responses from the cen-
tral authority to the demands. The second phase comprised the stage
of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent strife by the oppos-
ing factions to gain territory. For the purposes of this work, we are
concerned with the first phase and the responses of the international
community to it.
1. An Analysis of the Push for Independence.
Hostilities in Yugoslavia began on June 27, 1991 when the federal
troops moved against secessionists in Slovenia. At this stage, there was
no doubt that the parent state in Yugoslavia was opposed to the seces-
sionist attempts, let alone the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia.
Phase one of the Yugoslavian crisis thus did not fit into the classi-
cal framework of the post-communist cases we have already consid-
ered. The demand for independence and the subsequent refusal by a
central administration that was capable of exerting control were typ-
ical of a classical post-colonial self-determination conflict. Nevertheless,
the responses by members of the international community, and by the
EC in particular, were not typical of those normally observed in post-
colonial cases. The initial responses expressed support for the territori-
al integrity of Yugoslavia."1 This resulted from the desire to maintain
the unity of the Federation and to an implicit rejection of the seces-
sionist claims. This policy was consistent with the practice in relation
to other post-colonial cases sharing similar characteristics. However,
this policy was not maintained.
71. In statements made at the Security Council, many of the Members made
references to the territorial integrity and unity of the state. See, e.g., SECURITY
COUNCIL, PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3009TH MEETING, at 27-28, 36-37,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (Prov. ed. 1991) (mimeographed document, statements by Ec-
uador, Zimbabwe, Yemen, and Cuba).
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It has already been noted that hostilities broke out in June 1991
with the assault by Federal troops against secessionists in Slovenia.
The use of force to suppress secessionists in a post-colonial type con-
flict is not only common, but it is also not prohibited by international
law and is arguably a domestic issue subject to human rights require-
ments. The past cases of Eritrea, Southern Sudan, Biafra, and Bangla-
desh easily prove this point. In the case of Yugoslavia however, the use
of force by the central authority met with a different response. As
early as September 1, 1990, the EC called on the Croatian militia to
demobilize and on the Federal army to "return to barracks.' There
were further calls from the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) for the suspension of hostilities, the withdrawal of
combatants and a moratorium on independence declarations. In July
1991, the EC banned the export of arms to Yugoslavia and to the re-
gional factions engaged in the conflict. In September 1991, the Securi-
ty Council took a much more serious view of the situation and passed
a unanimous resolution expressing concern that the "continuation of
[the] situation constitutes a threat to international peace and securi-
ty."7' The Council's resolution was very significant since such a deter-
mination in pursuance of Article 39 of the UN Charter opened the way
for further action under chapter VII. The Security Council subsequent-
ly decided that "all States shall for the purposes of establishing peace
and security in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment
to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following
consultation between the Secretary General and the Government of
Yugoslavia. 4 In October 1991, the EC went further and prepared its
own stringent set of sanctions against Yugoslavia."' In November, the
Security Council authorized the deployment of 15,000 peace keeping
troops to Yugoslavia after securing agreement for a cease fire. 6 A
unique aspect of the conflict thus far was that despite its similarity to
previous cases in the post-colonial context, and notwithstanding the
depth of practice among members of the EC and the U.N., the issue
was dealt with as if it were an international conflict. The parent state
resisting disintegration was subject to sanctions and admonitions. The
situation left the impression that the international system was willing
to look on the secessionists favorably, in spite of the resistance of the
parent state. Later developments confirmed this impression.
72. Franck, supra note 6, at 21.
73. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., Supp. for Jul.-Sept.
1991, U.N. Doc. S/713 (1991).
74. Id. See also S.C. Res 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023rd mtg., Supp. for
Oct.-Dec. 1991, U.N. Doc. S/724 (1991) (establishing a committee to monitor compli-
ance with the sanctions).
75. Franck, supra note 6, at 23.
76. S.C. Res 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3018 mtg., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1991,
U.N. Doc. S/721 (1991).
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Throughout the initial stages of the conflict, Germany indicated a
willingness to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Germany delayed recog-
nition because of pressure from the EC for a coordinated, common
approach to the crisis. However, it became obvious that the slow devel-
opment of a common EC policy could precipitate unilateral actions by
its members and, in particular, Germany. Thus, on October 4, 1991,
the EC produced a formula for the recognition of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The formula, developed by
Lord Carrington, included the requirement that each of the "states"
make adequate arrangements for the "protection of minorities, includ-
ing human rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain ar-
eas."7' The Carrington formula was later modified to include the re-
quirement to respect the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the
Charter of Paris. The acceptance of the conditions in the formula
paved the way for the recognition of the new states by the EC. Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Slovenia, and Croatia were admitted into the U.N. on
May 26, 1992.78
Notwithstanding the admission of the new states, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzogovina were still subject to attacks from Yugoslavia. How-
ever, that fact neither deterred their admission nor brought into ques-
tion its validity. In fact, the President of the General Assembly was
careful to note that the continued attacks against the states constitut-
ed attacks against UN members and were illegal under the UN char-
ter.79 The United States' representative was even more forthright in
his assessment of the situation, stating that
[tjhe changes that have taken place in Yugoslavia have fundamen-
tally altered the previous structures. If Serbia and Montenegro de-
sire to sit in the U.N., they should be required to apply for mem-
bership and be held to the same standards as all other applicants.
Specifically, they must prove to the Members of the U.N. that the
so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a peace-loving State.'
For all intents and purposes, neither the U.N. nor the EC took the
view that Yugoslavia constituted a post-colonial case. What factors
could have justified a different approach to the new states from the
former Yugoslavia?
77. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 713, at Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/23169 (1991) (mimeographed
document). In November, a more detailed formula was produced by the European
Community Peace Conference meeting in the Hague. See Franck, supra note 6, at
24, n.52
78. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PROVISIONAL VERBATIM REcoRD OF THE 86TH MEETING,
46TH SESS., U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.86 (Prov. ed. 1992) (mimeographed document).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 12.
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2. The Differences Between the Yugoslavian Case and the Post-
Colonial Cases
Unlike the other post-communist situations, the secessionists in
Yugoslavia had to contend with the forceful resistance of the parent
state. The Yugoslavian cases therefore have the appearance and the
substance of the post-colonial types. Even upon closer examination, one
finds it hard to identify any substantive factor that differentiates the
Yugoslav cases from the post-colonial ones. The Security Council reso-
lution concluding that the crisis constituted a threat to international
peace and security relied, inter alia, on the hundreds of thousands of
refugees that had been generated by the war, the heavy loss of human
life, and the adverse consequences of the war on countries in the re-
gion. These are hardly distinguishing factors. These same factors were
present, but were virtually taken for granted, in the secessionist con-
flicts in Biafra, Eritrea, and currently in the southern Sudan, all of
which are typical post-colonial cases.
At the risk of seeming cynical, it may be noted that the one signif-
icant difference between the Yugoslav cases and the other post-colonial
cases is geography. The Yugoslav cases constituted the first test of
post-colonial type secessionist conflict in Europe. Faced with the pros-
pect of instability and the threat to regional security that has charac-
terized similar conflicts outside Europe and was likely to flow from
this crisis, the EC reacted by recognizing the new states. Presumably,
the acceptance of the legitimacy of the secessions was part of the
strategy of managing the crisis by minimizing threats to peace and
security in the region. This strategy was not dictated by any legal
principle or the desire to develop a basis for dealing with similar situa-
tions in the future. Indeed, it is unlikely that the EC will react similar-
ly to situations outside Europe even if the conditions appear similar
unless its strategic or other interests are at stake. This view under-
scores the preponderance of strategic, economic, and political interests
as well as the limited relevance of legal principles in determining the
responses to cases of secession.
The problem with this cynical assessment is that it overlooks the
possibility of a genuine commitment by the international system to de-
velop new rules for dealing with post-colonial type secessions in the
post-cold war period. This possibility could be a very significant devel-
opment in post-cold war international law and deserves a close exami-
nation.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME FOR
POST-COLONIAL SECESSION
The responses of the international system to the Yugoslavian
crisis are significant because they could well indicate the direction of
international law on questions of secession in the future. Thomas
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Franck has identified the following responses to the crisis:
1. The international system does not recognize a general right of
secession but may assist the government of a state that is of good
standing to find constructive alternatives to secessionist claim.
2. The international system regards egregious and protracted
violence by and against the secessionist forces as likely to give rise to a
threat to international peace by endangering flows of refugees, tempt-
ing potential external intervention, and disrupting international trade
in essential goods and services. This is sufficient to transform a civil
war from a domestic to an international dispute, validating systematic
intervention in the form of debate, recommendations for settlement,
demands for cease fire, and an embargo on supplies used in combat
imposed equally on government and secessionists. The international
, system in such a situation will no longer presumptively side with gov-
ernments against secessionists except, perhaps, where the secession is
being fomented or supported by an external intervening party.
3. With the prior consent of the government and the secessionists,
the international system may provide peacekeepers charged to secure
the combatants' disengagement from an agreed neutralized and demili-
tarized zone.
4. The international system does not prohibit secession. It will
extend recognition to a secessionist territory government if (a) that
government has demonstrated effective continuous control over its
territory; (b) the government has made provision for accepting relevant
international obligations by, inter alia, making provision in its consti-
tution and by ratifying relevant international legal instruments for the
protection of the nationality, cultural, linguistic, and religious rights of
its minorities; and (c) where it has taken constitutional steps to ensure
the political autonomy for its postmodern tribal minorities if they de-
sire it.
5. A new state created by secession is entitled to those boundaries
that were administratively applicable to it prior to independence when
it was a unit of a parent state.81
There is no doubt that this assessment correctly reflects the re-
sponses of the international system to the crisis in Yugoslavia. The
first three responses, however, are not exclusive to the Yugoslavian
crisis. The responses of the international system to the Congo crisis in
the 1960s' and the problems in Cyprus over the creation of the Turk-
81. Franck, supra note 6, at 19-27.
82. The secession of Katanga from the Congo Republic in 1960 was the first test
of the U.N. position on post-colonial self-determination. See generally E.M. Miller,
Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 66 AM. J. INTL L. 1
(1961). Soon after the Katanga Province declared its independence, Belgium sent
troops to assist the rebel province. In response, the Security Council called on Bel-
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ish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) were similar."
The progression from the initial response of neutrality to the ac-
ceptance and support for the secessionists is unique to the Yugoslavian
crisis. There is no evidence that this is the result of a conscious effort
to develop a regime to deal with the crisis and similar situations in the
future. They seem like ad hoc reactions to the crisis as it developed.
This does not, of course, rule out the potential of these responses as
indications of the probable normative and systematic development of a
new regime on post-colonial self-determination. However, any such
potential is undermined by a number of factors. First, for the regime to
be developed, the conduct of the international community in relation to
the structures created from the crisis and in respect of which the re-
gime is developed will need to be supportive and consistent. The raison
d'etre in developing the regime is the preservation of international
peace and security and the maintenance of order generally. To be effec-
tive, the regime must also be backed up by the willingness to protect
the entities that are created as a result of the operation of the regime.
These features have been absent in relation to the Yugoslavian crisis.
The admission of the new states into the U.N. was an obvious indica-
tion of their acceptance as sovereign states entitled to rights and pro-
tection under the UN Charter. In the case of Bosnia, for instance, the
territory has been subject to Serbian attacks since its creation, but a
Kuwait type intervention to protect Bosnia as a member of the U.N.
under aggression has never been an issue in the efforts to stop the war
in the former Yugoslavia. If the operation of the regime permits the
creation of a new state that nonetheless remains subject to the forceful
aggression of its former parent state, then the regime looses its credi-
gium to withdraw its forces and authorized the dispatch of UN troops in response to
a request from the Congo Republic. However, the UN action was stated to be limit-
ed as a response to the involvement of Belgian troops and the Secretary General
and the Security Council both declared that the UN forces would not intervene to
influence the outcome of any internal conflict, By implication, the initial UN re-
sponse was to remain neutral beyond the Belgian intervention and treat both the
secessionists and the central government equally. In late 1961, this position of neu-
trality changed when the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the
secession of Katanga and affirming the territorial integrity of the Congo Republic as
a whole. This resolution led to the active intervention by the U.N. in the conflict
itself and subsequently influenced a settlement in favor of the central government.
See S.C. Res. 5002, supra note 15. See also Questions Concerning the Situation in
the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), supra note 15.
83. In the case of Cyprus, U.N. efforts to seek a negotiated solution between the
secessionists and the parent state are still continuing after a decade of the unilater-
al declaration of the TRNC. It is worth noting that in its initial response to the
crisis, the Security Council condemned the secession and declared it void, calling on
states not to recognize the TRNC. See S.C. Res 541, supra note 16. It must be
stressed, however, that the Security Council resolution was not meant as a state-
ment on the validity of the secession as such in international law. It condemned the
particular act of secession on the basis that it violated treaty arrangements in force
relating to the territory. See generally Blay, supra note 4, at 100.
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bility and essence.
Whatever the motivation for its development may be, the regime
does not appear to be intended to operate outside the Yugoslavian con-
text. Despite the many similarities, including the religious dimension,
between the secessionist claims in Yugoslavia and in the Southern
Sudan, there has been no indication from either the EC or the U.N.
that the regime may be worth applying in that context. The explana-
tion for this may be that the responses to the crisis in Yugoslavia were
not intended to develop any regime as such for secessionist cases.
While they may have the potential to be developed into such a regime,
the failure to respond to similar cases in the same manner removes
any degree of consistency that may be associated with the regime and
undermines its potential as an indication of the normative develop-
ment of international law on secessionist self-determination.
Claims of post-colonial self-determination will continue so long as
ethnicity and nationalist parochial sentiments remain a part of the
culture of human nature. In the post-cold war era when the democratic
governance is gradually being accepted as a possible right and a neces-
sary standard to be expected from all nations," the events of Yugosla-
via and the responses being developed provide the international sys-
tem with a good opportunity to develop a regime on post-colonial self-
determination. The failure to use the opportunity to develop prescrip-
tions on the subject will only exacerbate the uncertainty of the law on
the issue and the ambivalence towards secessionist conflicts.
84. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. IN7L L. 46 (1992).
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